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Breaking Out of Recession:  
Gauging Texas’ Response  
to Fed Stimulus
By David Luttrell and Harvey Rosenblum
The Federal Reserve’s 
 Eleventh District has been 
more responsive to monetary 
stimulus than other regions.
From the time the U.S. recession began 
in December 2007 through the subsequent 
recovery, Texas and the Eleventh Federal Re-
serve District have outperformed the nation.1 
While economic activity is better in Texas, it 
remains far from robust. And though Texas 
employment hasn’t fully reclaimed levels 
reached before the crisis (Chart 1), the other 
11 Federal Reserve districts remain 3 to 8 per-
cent below predownturn employment peaks 
as a postrecessionary disquiet lingers.
This sluggish national performance 
has occurred despite the enormous fis-
cal and monetary firepower unleashed to 
combat the financial crisis and accompany-
ing recession.2 Why has Texas achieved a 
comparatively greater recovery than the 
nation (Table 1)? State economies respond 
differently to economic shocks and policy 
Chart 1
Employment Peaked Later and Rebounded Quicker in Dallas Fed District
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NOTE: The timing of employment peaks varied across Federal Reserve districts. For example, Atlanta district employment peaked in April 
2007; Dallas peaked in August 2008.
SOURCES: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; authors’ calculations.
actions reflecting regional variations in in-
dustry composition and the health of in-
stitutions. Texas, entering recession about 
eight months after the nation, emerged 
from the downturn in third quarter 2009 
and outpaced the rest of the country in 
employment growth with the aid of its 
healthier banking sector, subdued housing 
boom (and subsequent bust) and global 
trade competiveness.
Economists Kenneth Rogoff and Car-
men Reinhart suggest that recoveries from 
recessions associated with financial crises 
tend to be sluggish, drawn-out episodes. 
This generalization applies to dozens of 
countries.3 Through midyear, the recent 
U.S. recovery appears to be no exception, 
despite monetary and fiscal authorities’ 
relatively large and timely policy responses 
based on the real-time data at their dis-
posal.4 The recent U.S. experience under-
scores Rogoff and Reinhart’s “Second Great 
Contraction” label for the U.S. slow-growth 
predicament rather than the often used 
“Great Recession” tag.
Sizeable Stimulus
The first large legislative policy response 
was the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP), enacted in October 2008 
and mostly used to recapitalize the banking 
and financial system. A second major fiscal 
policy effort, the $787 billion American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act, took effect in 
February 2009, 14 months after the recession 
began. It provided tax cuts, extended unem-
ployment benefits, increased federal funds 
for education and health care, and promised 
“shovel-ready” infrastructure projects. The 
time lag associated with implementing fiscal 
stimulus prompted Stanford professor Robert 
Hall, the outgoing American Economic As-
sociation president, to say: “The government 
is incapable of executing a rapid and large 
increase in purchases.”5SouthwestEconomy    FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • THIRD QUARTER 2011 4
Federal Reserve monetary policy, the 
focus here, provided channels of economic 
support. Two inherent aspects of Fed pol-
icymaking—a relatively small number of 
decisionmakers and the ability to meet fre-
quently—enable a timely response. But such 
action does not guarantee an immediate or 
sizeable impact. The Fed undertook policies 
aimed at stimulating aggregate demand and 
reducing the effects of deleveraging and the 
prospects of deflation. These moves included: 
•	A series of reductions in the Fed’s tradi-
tional policy instrument, the federal funds 
rate, to near-zero, where it has remained 
since December 2008;
•	Encouraging banks to borrow in large 
amounts and for extended maturities di-
rectly from the Fed through the discount 
window;
•	Creation of a wide range of special and 
temporary credit facilities for lending to 
banks, nonbank primary dealers (which 
handle sales of Treasury securities), credit 
intermediaries and other central banks;6
•	Reduction of long-term interest rates 
through Fed purchases of more than $1.8 
trillion of mortgage-backed bonds and  
Treasuries.
Monetary Policy and Healthy Banks
Fed policy moves stimulated economic 
growth through four primary avenues: a) the 
bank loan channel; b) the securities market 
channel; c) the asset prices and wealth chan-
nel; and d) the exchange-rate channel (Chart 
2). Regional economic factors account for sig-
nificant differences in the functioning of bank 
lending, wealth effects and trade competitive-
ness. Only the securities market channel is 
generally dominated by national economic 
and financial market developments.
These four channels influenced the 
real economy during much of the quarter 
century preceding 2007 because banks 
generally held enough capital to safe-
guard against bad loans and other risks. 
The transmission mechanism connecting 
monetary policy and the macroeconomy 
depended on a well-oiled banking and 
financial sector that during the recent fi-
nancial crisis became conspicuous by its 
absence. 
The bank capital linkage, which com-
pletes the financial market architecture of 
effective monetary policy, is a function of 
both regulatory policy and the economic 
shocks affecting the health and vitality of 
the banking sector.7 The well-being of the 
banking system—not entirely within the 
power of the Fed—varied across the coun-
try and helped account for differences in 
monetary policy impact between regions.
Throughout the recession and subse-
quent recovery, Eleventh District banks ex-
perienced a smaller percentage of problem 
loans than banks in the nation as a whole 
(Chart 3). Noncurrent loans (generally 90 
days past due) and loan write-offs erode 
bank capital, often prompting an institution 
to reduce its loan portfolio. This can cre-
ate broader economic issues as decreased 
lending diminishes local economic growth, 
ultimately affecting the ability of other busi-
nesses and households to repay their loans 
and forcing further loan write-downs and 
capital reductions, accompanied by still more 
slowing. Texas banks entered the recession 
with a reasonably strong capital position and, 
subsequently, maintained much of it.8
Texas Banks and Lessons Learned 
Plunging oil prices and a real estate crisis 
left Texas in near-depression condition and at 
the center of the savings-and-loan collapse of 
the late 1980s. From 1987 through 1991, Texas 
experienced 729 bank failures, representing 
38 percent of national bank closures. By com-
parison, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. data 
reveal that from 2007 through August 2011, 
only eight Texas banks failed, comprising just 
2 percent of the period’s U.S. closures. The 
state’s less-pronounced housing market boom 
and bust is a key reason for this performance.
Table 1
Recovery Appears Stronger in Texas Relative to Nation
U.S. Texas As of (2011)
Percent change from respective business cycle peak (%)*
Employment –5.0 –0.3 August
Real personal income 1.1 3.8 First quarter
Real per capita personal income –1.8 –0.7 First quarter
Labor force participants –0.2 4.9 August
Population 3.5 5.6 Second quarter
Most recent measure (%)
Unemployment rate 9.1 8.5 August
Labor force participation rate 64.0 65.3 August
Home price change from peak –25.2 –2.6 June
* Peak-to-current percent change: the U.S. business cycle peak is dated December 2007 or fourth quarter 2007, and the Texas cycle peak is 
August 2008 or third quarter 2008.
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Haver Analytics; Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations.
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Chart 3
Noncurrent Loan Burden Lighter for Eleventh District than U.S. Banks
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NOTE: Noncurrent loans are defined as loans past due 90 days or more, plus loans on nonaccrual status.
SOURCE: Second quarter 2011 Report of Condition and Income, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.
Chart 4
Eleventh District Banks Show Less Distress than U.S. Counterparts
















NOTE: The Texas ratio is defined as noncurrent loans plus other real estate owned as a percentage of tangible equity capital plus loan loss 
reserves.
SOURCE: Second quarter 2011 Report of Condition and Income, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.
One frequently used gauge of over-
all banking-sector distress is the so-called 
Texas ratio, which attempts to assess banks’ 
ability to withstand losses. A Texas ratio 
above 100 percent suggests the potential 
for troubled assets—principally noncurrent 
loans and real estate owned—to wipe out 
an institution’s capital base. In the 1980s 
crisis, 20 percent of Eleventh District banks 
had a Texas ratio exceeding 100 percent—
thus, the origin of the ratio’s name. Suggest-
ing that Texas banks learned some difficult 
lessons during the 1980s, slightly more 
than 1 percent of district banks were at this 
danger threshold in second quarter 2011, 
compared with a bit more than 5 percent of 
U.S. banks (Chart 4). 
Further, recapitalization and economic 
reconciliation during the 1980s helped 
district banks fare comparatively well in 
the current period along with much of the 
Northeast, whose regional banking crisis 
occurred in the early 1990s (Chart 5).
Economic expansion remains sluggish 
in many Fed districts (as noted in Chart 1). 
Some of the worst performers in terms of 
employment growth, such as the Atlanta 
and San Francisco districts, confront still-
troubled commercial and residential real 
estate markets. Significant losses and capi-
tal write-downs on residential construc-
tion and commercial land development 
loans pressure banking capital, limiting the 
ability to lend. In some states in these re-
gions, housing prices fell 30 to 50 percent, 
engendering negative household wealth 
effects. The Atlanta and San Francisco 
districts consequently attracted fewer new 
residents and saw some of the country’s 
highest unemployment. Reflecting housing 
wealth declines, overextended consumer 
mortgage debt and high-risk home equity 
lending, many homeowners in these re-
gions owe more on their mortgages than 
their houses are worth. Negative-equity is-
sues remain severe in Nevada (63 percent 
of mortgaged properties), Arizona (50 per-
cent), Florida (46 percent) and California 
(31 percent).9
Following the 1980s collapse, Texas 
regulators bolstered rules governing loan-
to-value ratios on residential real estate 
loans and limited or delayed implemen-
tation of home-equity lending, reverse 
mortgages and home-equity lines of credit. 
Given this oversight and other factors such 
as ample land availability and fewer de-
velopment and zoning restrictions, Texas 
housing stock increased during the nation-
al boom without the rapidly rising home 
prices and lax lending standards found 
elsewhere.10 Burdened by less housing 
fallout, and consequently less household 
leverage, the Texas economy remained 
relatively healthy, with greater job-creating 
capability.11 The state also avoided a major 
wealth shock and loss of collateral value 
underpinning loans, allowing the asset-
price and wealth channel of monetary 
policy to remain relatively unblocked. Ad-
ditionally, Texas sustained relatively fewer 
credit card and other consumer loan delin-
quencies. 
Trade Boosts Growth
The impact of lower interest rates on 
the value of the dollar is an indirect but SouthwestEconomy    FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • THIRD QUARTER 2011 6
important monetary policy transmission 
channel. A weaker dollar spurs exports, 
and Texas is the country’s largest exporter, 
comprising almost one-sixth of the na-
tion’s total by origin of movement. The 
state’s top exporting industries in 2010 
were chemicals, computers and electron-
ics, petroleum and coal, and machinery 
and transportation equipment.12 After the 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
took effect in January 1994, real (inflation-
adjusted) Texas exports to Mexico and 
Canada grew 12 percent annually through 
2000. Further, Texas exports to China have 
expanded 25 percent annually following 
admission of China into the World Trade 
Organization in December 2001.
Mexico remained the state’s largest 
trading partner last year, accounting for 
35 percent of Texas exports, followed by 
Canada, 9 percent, and China, 5 percent. 
Texas is the nation’s leading producer of 
crude oil, natural gas and lignite coal. Pe-
troleum and coal exports have increased 
more than fourfold since 2005, making up 
17 percent of total state exports in 2010. 
While the Texas economy is less depen-
dent on oil and gas than in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, energy price increases remain 
generally beneficial, an advantage over 
most other states whose economies tend to 
slow when energy prices rise.13
Differences in products states sell 
and where those exports go produce ef-
fective exchange-rate shifts reflecting a 
state’s trade-weighted value of the dol-
lar.14 In the case of Texas, the real value 
of the Mexican peso relative to the dollar 
especially influences export attractiveness. 
Differences in relative foreign currency 
prices for Texas products and the nation at 
large are depicted in Chart 6. Underlying 
the weakening real trade-weighted values 
of the dollar in Texas and the U.S. are the 
appreciating currencies of the largest U.S. 
trading partner, Canada, and the largest 
foreign buyer of Texas products, Mexico. 
Texas trade-competitiveness has increased, 
contributing to higher demand for its ex-
ports, boosting manufacturing output and 
buttressing the state economy through the 
exchange-rate channel of monetary policy.
Other Contributing Factors 
Even in the absence of extraordinary 
monetary and fiscal policy intervention, 
the Texas economy likely would have out-
performed the nation during the recovery. 
Since 1990, the state’s average annual job 
growth has exceeded the nation’s by about 
a percentage point. Year to date through 
August, that advantage has increased to 
about 1.3 percentage points, providing a 
potent lure to prospective workers.
Data from the 2010 census show 
Texas’ population expanded 48 percent 
since 1990, twice the national rate. Net 
births (births minus deaths) accounted for 
Chart 5
Eleventh District Relatively Less Encumbered by Potential Bank Asset Problems 
(Second quarter 2011)




































SOURCE: Second quarter 2011 Report of Condition and Income, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.
The key drivers of Texas’ 
favorable response to 
 monetary policy stimulus 
were its relatively healthy 
and well-capitalized banks, 
the absence of a boom-and-
bust cycle in housing and 
internationally competitive 
export industries.	 FEDERAL	RESERVE	BANK	OF	DALLAS	•	THIRD	QUARTER	2011 SouthwestEconomy 7
60 percent of the growth; migration from 
other countries and states accounted for 
40 percent.15 Domestic inflows rose signifi-
cantly in 2007–09, perhaps reflecting the 
relatively strong state economy before the 
recession and the shorter business-cycle 
contraction. In the long term, a relatively 
low cost of living, including no state in-
come tax, and the availability of jobs at-
tract workers.
In-migration from abroad often hinges 
on conditions in countries of origin. Recent 
violence in Mexico has produced an influx 
of middle- to high-income immigrants, 
bringing their human and financial capital 
across the border to El Paso, Houston, San 
Antonio and Austin.16 
Texas has benefited from structural 
advantages such as natural resources, Gulf 
ports and geographic proximity to its larg-
est trade partner. Additionally, regional 
economic drivers have contributed to the 
functioning of the bank loan, asset price/
wealth and exchange-rate channels of 
monetary policy. Factors such as the rela-
tive health of the Texas banking sector 
and housing market and strong export 
industries helped promote national policy 
effectiveness and allowed the state to out-
perform the nation.
Luttrell is a senior economic analyst and coordi-
nator of economic and financial analysis, and 
Rosenblum is executive vice president and director 
of research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Chart 6
Texas’ Weaker Effective Exchange Rate Boosts State Exports
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Notes
Thanks to Pia Orrenius, John Duca, Jackson Thies and Tom 
Siems for their contributions.
1 The Eleventh Federal Reserve District consists of Texas, 
northern Louisiana and southern New Mexico. Texas accounts 
for 95 percent of the Eleventh District’s output.
2 The Fed’s ability to lower real interest rates was greatly 
inhibited by the zero bound and falling inflation rates during 
the recession.
3 See This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial 
Folly, by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009, or subsequent work, 
“After the Fall,” by Carmen and Vincent Reinhart, paper 
presented at the Kansas City Economic Symposium, Jackson 
Hole, Wyo., Aug. 27, 2010, www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/
sympos/2010/2010-08-17-reinhart.pdf.
4 Policymakers had to work with real-time data that, in this 
case, underestimated the extent and seriousness of the 
downturn. The initial estimate of real GDP performance was 
subsequently lowered to –8.9 percent for fourth quarter 2008 
(from –3.8 percent) and to –6.7 percent for first quarter 2009 
(from –6.1 percent) in the latest GDP revisions, released in 
July 2011. Indeed, the Business Cycle Dating Committee at 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) did not 
officially date the beginning of the recession until December 
2008, a full year after the recession was deemed to have 
begun in December 2007. 
5 The American Economic Association is the world’s largest 
organization for economists. See “The Long Slump,” by 
Robert Hall, AEA presidential address, American Economic 
Review, April 2011, p. 467.
6 See “Federal Reserve Liquidity Programs: An Update,” by 
Niel Willardson and LuAnne Pederson, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis The Region, June 2010.
7 See “Regulatory and Monetary Policies Meet ‘Too Big to Fail,’” 
by Harvey Rosenblum, Jessica J. Renier and Richard Alm, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Letter, vol. 5, no. 3, 
2010, www.dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2010/el1003.html.
8 This analysis abstracts from the fact that Texas is home 
to branches of some of the nation’s largest banks, a few of 
which required extraordinary federal government assistance 
during the financial crisis. See note 7. For earlier analysis at 
the regional level, see “What Reforms Are Needed to Improve 
the Safety and Soundness of the Banking System?” Harvey 
Rosenblum, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic 
Review, vol. 92, nos. 1–2, 2007, pp. 101–13.
9 For data on negative equity, see CoreLogic first quarter 2011 
negative equity report, June 7, 2011, www.corelogic.com/
about-us/news/asset_upload_file726_7102.pdf.
10 For more Texas housing details, see “Texas Housing 
on Bumpy Road After Stimulus Effects Fade,” by D’Ann 
Petersen and Adam Swadley, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
Southwest Economy, Second Quarter 2011, www.dallasfed.
org/research/swe/2011/swe1102b.cfm. 
11 For more on Texas household debt burdens and the outlook 
for Texas’ relative strength, see “Texas Economy to Ride 
Higher in the Saddle in 2011,” by Keith R. Phillips and Emily 
Kerr, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest Economy, 
First Quarter 2011, www.dallasfed.org/research/swe/2011/
swe1101b.cfm.
12 See “Industry Clusters Shape Texas Economy,” by Laila 
Assanie and Mine K. Yücel, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
Southwest Economy, no. 5, 2007, www.dallasfed.org/
research/swe/2007/swe0705b.cfm.
13 See “Oil and Gas Rises Again in a Diversified Texas,” by 
Mine K. Yücel and Jackson Thies, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas Southwest Economy, First Quarter 2011,  
www.dallasfed.org/research/swe/2011/swe1101g.cfm.
14 See “New Tool Gauges Impact of Exchange Rates on 
States,” by Keith R. Phillips, Steve Brzezinski and Barbara 
Davalos, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest Economy, 
Fourth Quarter 2010,  www.dallasfed.org/research/swe/2010/
swe1004b.pdf.
15 See “Keys to Economic Growth: What Drives Texas?” by 
Jason Saving, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest 
Economy, First Quarter 2009, www.dallasfed.org/research/
swe/2009/swe0901c.cfm.
16 See “Life on the Line,” by Andrew Rice, New York Times 
Magazine, July 28, 2011. 